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The Effect of Wal-Mart

Supercenters on Grocery
Prices in New England
Richard J. Volpe III and Nathalie Lavoie

The competitive price effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on national brand and private label
grocery prices in New England is examined. We use primary price data collected on several
identical products from six Supercenters in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island
and from conventional supermarkets. Taking into account demographics, store characteristics, and market conditions, we show that Wal-Mart decreases prices by 6 to 7% for
national brand goods and by 3 to 8% for private label goods. Price decreases are most significant in the dry grocery and dairy departments. Moreover, Wal-Mart sets grocery prices
significantly lower than its competitors.

The discount retailer Wal-Mart has been a popular topic of discussion and
debate for more than a decade. Much of the recent controversy surrounding
Wal-Mart in the economic literature and the popular press has focused on food retailing. Wal-Mart's meteoric rise to dominance in U.S. food retailing has motivated
efforts to understand the effects of Supercenter stores on consumers, competitors,
and the economy in general. The primary objective of this study is to estimate the
competitive effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conventional supermarkets, that is, the extent to which Supercenters bring about a decrease in their rivals'
price. Additionally, we estimate price differences between Supercenters and conventional stores to determine the savings realized by shopping at Supercenters.
We examine these two objectives separately for national brands and private labels
to determine whether Supercenters impact differently the two labels.
Supercenters are Wal-Mart stores that offer entire lines of groceries in addition to
all of the usual wares found at conventional Wal-Mart stores. Wal-Mart became the

largest food retailer in the United States in 2003, largely through the expansion of

Supercenters, and is currently the leading grocer worldwide (Progressive Grocer).

Richard J. Volpe III is a Ph.D. student, Department of Agricultural and Resource
Economics, University of California, Davis.
0 Nathalie Lavoie is Assistant Professor, Department of Resource Economics, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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By the end of 2003 there were 1,376 Supercenters in the United States, with over
1,000 more planned for construction by 2008 (Bianco and Zellner). Much of the
Supercenter expansion is projected to take place in regions such as New England
and California, where Wal-Mart is newer and has a smaller presence compared
to the South and Midwest, where the firm originated.
Supercenters are the subject of as much, if not more, controversy than conventional Wal-Mart stores. A glance at news headlines on any given day reveals
that Wal-Mart is confronting opposition from citizens and local governments in
many of the locations where it chooses to erect Supercenters. The public outcry
is spurred partly from Wal-Mart's low wages and substandard health care benefits to its nonunionized employees and the perception that jobs are lost when
employee-unionized rivals go out of business due to Wal-Mart's entry (Daykin).
For that reason, opposition in California has been particularly strong. Wal-Mart's
announcement that it would open forty Supercenters in this state led to a fourmonth strike of grocery unions in 2003 to protest the cuts made in labor expenses
by rival chains to compete. In 2004, residents of a suburb of Los Angeles protested
and voted against the construction of a Supercenter citing low wages paid to em-

ployees and Wal-Mart's refusal to allow labor unions (Zwiebach; Hudson and
McWilliams). In the U.S. Northeast and in urban areas, the outcry also stems
from the store's image. The construction of a store in Miami was blocked on the
grounds that "its sprawling, suburban aesthetics and low-end appeal didn't conform to the city's architectural and social vision for the project" (Hudson and

McWilliams).

Despite the ongoing controversy and the growing importance of Supercenters
in all aspects of food retailing, the economic literature remains relatively scarce on

the economic impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters. This is partly due to the absence
of a data source; Wal-Mart does not participate in any of the public data collection
services.

Franklin examined the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on market concentration in the one hundred largest U.S. metropolitan areas in 1993 and 1999. He
found that Supercenters have no significant effect on supermarket concentration.
However, the market share obtained by Supercenters increases with time and is
inversely proportional to the income of the local consumers in metropolitan areas.
While there is no evidence in the literature that Supercenters are responsible
for the closing of supermarkets, Supercenters have been found to have a negative
effect on the sales of conventional supermarkets. For example, using a supermarket's frequent-shopper data base, Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg find that the
entry of a Wal-Mart Supercenter during the time period analyzed resulted in a
loss of volume of 17% by that supermarket. They estimate that the volume loss
amounted to a quarter of a million dollars in monthly revenues. Capps and Griffin
estimated that Wal-Mart Supercenters were directly responsible for a 21% reduction in sales for a regional chain of supermarkets in the Dallas/Fort Worth area
of Texas. The combined effect of Supercenters and Wal-Mart's wholesale outlet,
Sam's Club Stores, on supermarkets amounts to a loss of $15 to $17 billion in sales
from supermarkets nationwide in 2001 (USA Today, cited by Jones).
Wal-Mart Supercenters follow a different pricing strategy than most supermar-

kets. This may affect how supermarkets compete in price when a Supercenter is
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present. All Wal-Mart stores use everyday low pricing (EDLP), meaning that all
products are marked up by the same percentage regardless of the price at which
they were acquired (Vance and Scott). Sales, promotions, and advertising do not
play heavily into the practice of EDLP. Most supermarkets, by contrast, employ
high-low pricing (HLP), whereby most products are given a high markup but
a percentage of goods, changing on a regular basis, are put on promotion. In
many cases, promotional items are sold at a loss to the store with the intent to
increase customer traffic. Using a game theoretical approach, Jones demonstrated
that EDLP is profitable for Supercenters because it creates a stark difference in
prices from supermarkets. Moreover, supermarkets would be more profitable if
they switched to EDLP when competing with Supercenters. Supporting this notion, many of the largest supermarket chains in the nation are gradually lowering
their prices and decreasing the frequency and size of promotions at some of their
locations (Adamy).
With the EDLP strategy and its countervailing market power toward manufacturers (Dobson and Waterson; Chen; Wilke), Wal-Mart sets prices lower than
its competitors. According to a 2002 UBS Warburg study, Wal-Mart Supercenters'

prices are, on average, 14% lower than competing supermarkets (Bianco and
Zellner). Studies surveyed by Hausman and Leibtag (2005) show Wal-Mart prices
to be 8 to 27% lower than large supermarket chains.
To date however, the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at conventional

supermarkets has not been explored much in the literature, with the exceptions
of the studies by Woo et al. and Hausman and Leibtag (2004, 2005). Woo et al.
monitored prices at conventional supermarkets both before and after the entry
of a Wal-Mart Supercenter in the Athens, Georgia area. Their results showed that
supermarkets lowered their prices significantly prior to the Supercenter's entry,
but that prices gradually rose back to their original levels following entry. The
only supermarkets showing lasting effects from the Supercenter entry were those
with the highest prices at the beginning of the study.

Hausman and Leibtag (2004) used A. C. Nielsen household panel data for 19982001 to study the bias on the CPI price index of the current treatment of Wal-Mart

Supercenters in the index calculations. Using the same data, Hausman and Leibtag
(2005) estimate the consumer welfare impact of the entry Supercenters in the U.S.
food market by estimating the compensating variation. In the context of these two
studies, they also examine the price difference at superstores versus supermarkets.

The price differences are examined by food categories, but using simple averages
across markets. In this comparison, the authors do not isolate the competitive
effect of supercenters on competing stores. They find that, overall, superstores'
prices are 27% lower than traditional supermarkets. However, the compensating
variation is broken into two parts: (a) a variety effect from having access to a new

outlet, and (b) an indirect price effect associated with the decrease in price from
existing outlet.1 They estimate the variety effect to be 20.2% of food expenditure,

and the indirect price effect to be 4.8% of food expenditure. Thus, they find a
substantial benefit for households who have the choice to shop at Supercenters,
that is, a total welfare effect of 25% of food expenditure.

This study contributes to the literature on the economic impact of Wal-Mart
Supercenters and is unique in four respects. First, we estimate both the competitive effect of Supercenters on prices of competitors and the discount realized by
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shopping at a Supercenter, by grocery department. The impact of Wal-Mart is
likely to vary by grocery department because retailers increasingly employ category management tools and each supermarket category is treated as a strategic
business unit in pricing, merchandising, promotions, and product mix (Singh,
Hansen, and Blattberg). Second, given that Wal-Mart does not participate in any
of the public data collection services, we use a unique data set consisting of prices
collected directly off the shelves of the stores sampled. Third, we focus on the
effect of Supercenters in the states of New England (Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island), a new region of expansion for Supercenters and also a region
that is both wealthier and more densely populated than the U.S. South and Midwest, where Supercenters originated. Fourth, we conduct separate analyses for
national brand and private label products. National brand products are obtained
from national distributors and therefore are identical across all stores. National

brand products are more heavily advertised and are more popular among higherincome shoppers. Private label products, alternatively, are produced through a
form of vertical coordination and are heterogeneous across different chains. Despite having higher markups, they are universally cheaper than their national
brand substitutes and appeal to lower-income shoppers.2 Examining separately
national brands and private labels enables us to shed some light on the impact of
Supercenters on the national brand/private label margin and on strategic efforts
by supermarkets to maintain consumer loyalty.

Data

Because Wal-Mart does not participate in any public data collection ser
was necessary to gather primary price data. The data were gathered from
stores throughout the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Is
selection of the eighteen stores was made by the following criteria: six of th
are Wal-Mart Supercenters, another six are the largest supermarkets, in
floor size, found within five miles of each of the Supercenters. Hencefor
stores are referred to as "competing stores." The final six stores are used as c
ison stores to the six supermarkets competing with Wal-Mart Supercent
they will be referred to as "comparison stores." Using data from the 200
as well as the 2004 Trade Dimensions Retail Data Directory, we selected st
shared many similarities with the six competing supermarkets in terms
market conditions, and demographics.3
The fifty-four products sampled in this study were selected from a lar
compiled by Cotterill (1999a) and span the six major supermarket depa
grocery, dairy, frozen food, health and beauty aids (HBAs), meat, and p
The products were selected in proportion to departmental shares of sa
lated by Cotterill (1999a) in order to represent a typical consumer's mar
ket. This explains, for example, why more goods were sampled from the
department than from the dairy department. In every department the
of products was divided evenly between national brand and private lab
with the exception of the produce department, in which only national brand
were available. Taking into account that private label products differ acr
ferent supermarket chains, we used data from Consumer Reports to select pr
that do not vary much in quality among manufacturers.
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Figure 1. Average total price of the national brand (30 goods) and
private label (24 goods) market baskets, by store category

National Brand Private Label

The prices of the products were recorded directly off t

stores. Only nonpromotional prices were recorded, w

on the magnitudes of our estimated price difference. We
issue in the results section. Figure 1 reports the average

and private label market baskets for the three store cate

performed within a three-week period in October 20

trends in the data.

Figure 1 shows that for both national brand and private label products, the
average price of the entire basket is lower at competing stores than at comparison stores. Moreover, Supercenters have the lowest average price for both
market baskets and the average price difference between Supercenters and competing stores exceeds the average difference between competing and comparison
stores.

Price Indexes and Model Formulation

To examine the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters on the price of foo
ucts, we constructed price indexes by supermarket departments. Binkl
Connor (1998) have shown that fresh goods (red meats, milk, and produ

priced differently than packaged goods (products in the "dry grocery" and "h

and beauty" department). Departmental price indexes were constructed
expenditure-weighted relative prices. Expenditure-weighted relative pric
been used in previous work examining supermarket prices (Cotterill, 199
et al.; Yu and Connor). Weighting prices by expenditure allows for prop

counting of the different nature of market baskets as well as respects the pa

of consumption in the United States. Formally, the indexes are given by:

(1)

.-100
100
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where Vijk is the price index for brand i (i = N for national brand or P for private

label), department j, and store k. Wmj is the weight assigned to good m in department j and Pmijk is the relative price of good m of brand i in department j at store k.

The relative prices Pmijk were obtained by standardizing each observed shelf price
by the average price paid for the given product across all stores.5 Thus, the price

index Vijk is constructed as the weighted average price of the Mj goods of brand i
in department j of store k, divided by the same expression for store 1 (the reference

store) and multiplied by one hundred. The reference store is the Supercenter in
Raynham, MA, for national brand indexes and the Supercenter in Jewett City, CT,

for private label indexes. These stores were chosen because across departments
they have the lowest average prices.
The weight Wmj is the expenditure on good m, found in the market basket of
department j, relative to the total expenditure on all goods sampled in department
j. It is calculated as

(2) Wmj = Pm Cmj
m=1 -Pmj Cmj

where Pmj is the average price of good m in department j across all eighteen stores

sampled for this study and Cmj is the estimated per capita annual consumption
good m in department j in the United States in 2003 as measured by the Econom

Research Service of the USDA.

Tables 1 and 2 display the descriptive statistics for the departmental price indexes. They reveal two trends in the price indexes. First, for all departments
except for national brand meat, Supercenters have the lowest price indexes (least
expensive) and comparison stores have the highest price indexes (most expensive). Second, the coefficient of variation statistics reveal that the Supercenters
generally have the lowest price volatility while competing stores have the high-

Table 1. Summary statistics for expenditure-weighted national
brand price indexes
Grocery Dairy Frozen Food HBA Meat Produce
Mean

Supercenters 102.62 100.36 108.03 107.76 100.76 111.47
Compete 126.67 137.10 145.97 133.25 139.26 141.52
Compare 143.19 168.76 159.64 141.03 132.89 159.50
Standard Deviation

Supercenters 1.58 0.28 8.24 5.87 1.39 5.92
Compete 12.56 21.24 22.44 11.76 2.21 19.40
Compare 7.60 6.35 15.91 11.72 12.60 11.23
Coefficient of Variation

Supercenters 1.54% 0.03% 7.63% 5.48% 1.38% 5.31%
Compete 9.92% 15.57% 15.37% 8.83% 1.58% 13.71%
Compare 5.31% 3.76% 9.97% 8.31% 9.48% 7.04%
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Table 2. Summary statistics for expenditure-weighted private label
price indexes
Grocery Dairy Frozen Food HBA Meat
Mean

Supercenters 102.36 100.38 103.73 119.50 134.77
Compete 142.43 133.84 138.58 128.09 129.09
Compare 158.64 158.43 151.93 151.58 147.68
Standard Deviation

Supercenters 2.10 0.30 4.15 9.55 18.37
Compete 14.64 21.67 33.16 12.68 18.64
Compare 17.80 14.59 25.35 30.25 30.38
Coefficient of Variation

Supercenters 2.05% 0.30% 3.99% 7.99% 13.63%
Compete 10.28% 16.19% 23.93% 9.90% 14.44%
Compare 11.22% 9.21% 16.69% 19.95% 20.57%

est price volatility. One possible explanation is that

ability of supermarkets to coordinate prices and promo
Heimforth, and Bailey found this to be true in the cont
petition among supermarkets and larger warehouse sto
competing with Wal-Mart have been found to engage in
strategies (Khanna and Tice). Nonprice strategies includ
age, or variety. Several of the competing supermarket
were recently renovated, with features such as gasolin
and bookstores. If competing stores use a greater numbe
to compete with Supercenters than comparison stores,
stores to have the greatest overall price variability amon
The price indexes for all three store categories were
test of the effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on superma
model can be expressed as

(3) V = Po + P1 DAIRY + P2 FROZEN + P3 HBA + 14
+ 16 COMPETE + f7 COMPARE + Ps COMPETED

+ 19 COMPETEFROZ + 3io COMPETEHBA + 11
+ P12 COMPETEPROD + x13 COMPDAIRY + x14

+ 115 COMPHBA + 116 COMPMEAT + x17 COMPPR

where V represents the expenditure-weighted relat
scribed above. DAIRY, FROZEN, HBA (health and b

PRODUCE are binary variables included to capture pric
partments. Therefore, the reference category is groce
PARE are binary variables that represent the different
COMPETE equals one if the supermarket is a store com
center, and zero otherwise. COMPARE equals 1 if th
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located further away from a Supercenter and represents a comparison store,
and zero otherwise. These variables are also interacted with the departmental
binaries. We expect the results to indicate that Supercenters have the lowest
average prices among all store categories and that the competing stores have
lower average prices than the comparison stores. Hence the coefficients for COM-

PETE and COMPARE are anticipated to have positive signs, and the coefficient on COMPARE is expected to be greater in magnitude than the coefficient
on COMPETE, to represent this pattern for the grocery department. Given the
proper mapping of coefficients, we expect similar results to be realized for all
departments.6
X represents a vector of variables consisting of demographics, store characteristics, and market conditions. These variables, stressed in importance by a survey
of the literature on supermarket pricing and competition (see Volpe), measure
income, population density, the distance to the nearest large competitor, store
size, concentration, and the percentage of minorities in the local population. We
describe these variables next.

INCOME is a binary variable equal to 1 if the city or town, associated with
the index value, has a median household income greater than $45,725, that is, in
the upper half of the data set. Given that consumers become less price sensitive
as income increases (Hoch et al.) we expect the coefficient to be positive. The
binary nature of this variable is intended to reflect the average difference in prices

between areas of "high income" versus "low income" in New England.7 Income
data from the 2000 Census were used to generate this variable.
POPDENS represents population density and is expected to have a negative
sign, as food retailers have greater incentive to compete when consumers can
easily travel among stores (Lamm; Cotterill, 1986). Data on population and land
area for the cities and towns were available from the 2000 Census.

Concentration data were not available at levels disaggregated enough for this
study, and therefore two proxies are used in place of the conventional measurements of industry concentration, for example, four-firm concentration ratio and
the Herfindalh-Hirschman Index. DTLC is the distance, in miles, to the nearest
supermarket or Supercenter. CONCENTRATED is a binary variable equal to one
if the town or city associated with the price index has fewer than three large food
retailers. Both of these coefficients are expected to be positive. The locations of the

stores in each town or city were obtained from the Trade Dimensions 2004 Retail
Data Directory and driving distances among stores were determined using the
electronic service Mapquest.
SSIZE is the size of the store, in thousands of square feet. According to Binkley
and Connor (1996, 1998), store size can affect prices in two opposite directions.
Larger stores may enjoy economies of scale and thus charge lower prices. However, larger stores may also stock more items and provide more services, which
contribute to the rise in costs and thus prices. Binkley and Connor (1998) argue

that the second effect dominates for conventional retailers. The first effect most

likely dominates for Wal-Mart. Thus, the expected sign on SSIZE is indeterminate
for both national brands and private labels.8 Data on store size in square footage
were available from Trade Dimensions 2004 Retail Data Directory.
BH is the percentage of blacks and Hispanics living in the associated town.
Blacks and Hispanics are more sensitive to grocery prices (Hoch et al.). Thus, this
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variable is expected to be negative. Demographic data were obtained from the

2000 Census.

Results

Equation (3) was estimated separately for national brand (model A) and privat
label (model B) price indexes for ease of interpretation and readability. The resu
of the generalized least squares (GLS) estimations are compiled in table 3. The
models were estimated using GLS rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) be
cause preliminary regression results indicated heteroskedasticity resulting fro
different variances across departments. The models have high-explanatory pow
as evidenced by the models' F-statistics and the adjusted R2 values. Diagnostic
revealed no multicollinearity problem among the variables in the X vector. Con
sistent price data were not available for private label produce and therefore pri
indexes were not calculated for those goods. As a result, Model A has 108 observ
tions (six departments at eighteen stores) while Model B has ninety observation
(five departments at eighteen stores).
The demographics and market conditions all have expected signs, with the ex
ception of BH, which is not statistically significant. SSIZE is negative and signif
cant for both national brands and private labels indicating that larger stores ha
lower prices. The likely explanation for this result is that economies of scale e
able large stores, such as Supercenters and large conventional supermarkets, to
more efficient and charge lower prices. The coefficients indicate that a 1,000 square
feet increase in store size results in an average decrease in price of 0.25% for n
tional brands and a 0.88% decrease in price for private labels, when the coefficie
is expressed as a percentage of the average value of the dependent variable.9
The coefficient on INCOME is positive and statistically significant for both
brands. In percentage terms, the coefficients indicate that the price of nation
brands is 7% higher, and the average price of private labels is 24% higher in higherincome locations in New England than in lower-income locations. We posit th
this price increase reflects the price premium paid for groceries in high-incom
areas, which may be determined in part by differences in customer service o
amenities available in-store. Differences in private label quality are unlikely to
a determinant of this price difference, as private labels are identical within chains.
In general, expressed as a percentage of the average value of the dependent var
able, the effects of the demographics and market conditions on price are great
in magnitude for private label products than for the national brand product
except for the effect of market concentration (CONCENTRATED). This patter
supports the findings that supermarkets have greater control over private lab
prices as opposed to the national brand prices set by manufacturers (Mills) an
that consumers who purchase private label goods are more price sensitive tha
those who primarily purchase national brands (Dhar and Hoch).
Tables 4 and 5 give the expected price index value for each department and
store type, holding all demographics, market conditions, and store characterist
constant and adjusted for in-store promotional activity. Column 6 in each tab
is of particular interest. It reports the average price difference in percentage term
between competing stores and comparison stores. Those percentages represen
the estimated competitive effect of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on t
prices at conventional supermarkets.
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Table 3. Regression Results
Model

A

Model

B

National Brands Private Labels

Intercept 113.476*** 139.961***
(7.430) (14.665)

DAIRY

-2.258

-1.976

(6.609) (10.385)
FROZEN

5.412

1.373

(6.023) (10.891)
HBA

4.814

17.135*

(4.681)
MEAT

-1.851

(9.467)

32.404***

(4.818)
PRODUCE

(9.464)

8.852

(5.530)
COMPETE

18.765***

27.897***

(5.131) (10.722)
COMPARE

32.041***

41.297***

(5.171) (10.796)
COMPETEDAIRY

12.684

-6.617

(9.347) (14.687)
COMPETEFROZ

13.888

-5.224

(8.518) (15.402)
COMPETEHBA

1.764

-21.472**

(6.620) (13.388)
COMPETEMEAT

14.444**

-45.749***

(6.813) (13.384)
COMPETEPROD

5.992

(7.821)
COMPDAIRY

27.828***

1.763

(9.347) (14.687)
COMPFROZ

11.044

-8.090

(8.518) (15.402)
COMPHBA

-6.974

-24.194*

(6.620) (13.388)
COMPMEAT

-8.447

-43.365***

(6.813) (10.428)
COMPPROD

7.461

(7.821)
INCOME

8.570***

21.743***

(2.493)
POPDENS

-0.638

(0.427)
DTLC

0.627

-0.297***

(0.966)

-0.795***

(0.094)
CONCENTRATED

(0.826)

0.887

(0.499)
SSIZE

(4.826)

-1.581*

(0.182)

7.561***

(3.058)

1.031

(5.920)

(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued

Model

A

Model

B

National Brands Private Labels
BH

0.020

0.168

(0.132)
N
F

108

20.51***

Adjusted
***:

is

R2

Coefficient

significant

is

at

(0.256)
90

6.81***

0.81

0.57

significant

the

0.10

at

level.

the

0.01

le

Standard

e

A decrease in average prices is
all departments except for natio
the national brand of meat is no
a temporary pricing anomaly d
sample size for meat.
For both national brand and pr
fect of Supercenters occurs in t
prices of 17% and 12%, respectiv
and produce departments are als
centers. Supercenters cause a 9%
grocery items and produce. Sign
Supercenters for private label H

that the presence of Wal-Mart Sup
the prices of frozen food items, r

department for private label go
of Supercenters.
Column 4 and 5 of tables 4 and
the Wal-Mart Supercenters and
ences indicate to what extent Su

Table 4. Expected expenditure-weighted relative price indexes by
department for national brand goods (Model A)13
(1):

(2):

(3):

(4):

(5):

(6):

Wal-Mart Competing Comparison (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
Supercenters Stores Stores % difference % difference % difference

Grocery 113.476 132.241 145.517 -14.19*** -22.02*** -9.12***
Dairy 111.218 142.667 171.087 -22.04*** -34.99*** -16.61***
Frozen 118.888 151.541 161.973 -21.55*** -26.60*** -6.44
Food

HBA 118.290 138.819 143.357 -14.79*** -17.49*** -3.16
Meat 111.625 144.834 135.219 -22.93*** -17.45*** 7.11
Produce 122.328 147.085 161.830 -16.82*** -24.41*** -9.11**

***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significant at the 0.05 lev

Wal-Mart Supercenters in New England 15

Table 5. Expected expenditure-weighted relative price indexes by
department for private label goods (Model B)
(1):

(2):

(3):

(4):

(5):

(6):

Wal-Mart Competing Comparison (1-2) (1-3) (2-3)
Supercenters Stores Stores % difference % difference % difference
Grocery 139.961 167.858 181.258 -16.62*** -22.78*** -7.39
Dairy 137.985 159.265 181.045 -13.36*** -23.78*** -12.03**
Frozen 141.334 164.007 174.541 -13.82*** -19.03*** -6.04
Food

HBA 157.096 163.521 174.199 -3.93 -9.82** -6.13"*
Meat 172.365 154.513 170.297 11.55** 1.21 -9.27*

***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level. **: Significant

(column 4) and lower than comparison st
greater in magnitude than those calculat
stores. With two exceptions, Supercenter
erage, than those of conventional stores
label HBA products, for which the estima
vate label meat, for which Supercenters
all store categories. The HBA department
products that are also available at many o
and other mass merchandisers. Therefore
lower average price differences between
ative to other departments, is expected f

previously, the results for the meat departm

Column 4 of table 4 indicates that Superc
ucts between 14 and 23% lower than com
national brand price differences between
generally larger than the corresponding p
tween 4 and 17% (column 4 of table 5). Th
tional brand of dairy, frozen food, and m
products. As expected, the price differe
comparison stores. Supercenter prices are
35% depending on the national brand de
10 to 24% for private label departments
differences are for dairy products for bo
The prices collected for this study did n
ever, promotional activity is consistent w
sell at the same promotional price across
expected price index values for promotion
prices that consumers actually paid. Usin
and Big Y throughout the month of Octo
of market basket products that are on s
week. In doing so, we assume that the p
chains in October 2006 is indicative of th
Additionally, we used the promotional p
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Table 6. Estimated overall price discounts resulting from
promotional activity14
Competing Comparison
Stores

National

Private

Brand

Label

Stores

3.81%

3.58%

4.90%

4.93%

percentage discounts for
overall average percentage
and store category.
Table 7 reports the aver
Cotterill (1999a). These sh
mental

price differences rep
represent the average over
ventional supermarkets. T
between competing and c
two ways. With method 1
all of the percentage diff
only those effects that w
fects incorporating promo
These effects were obtain
competing stores by the o
The overall competitive ef
prices ranges from a 6.83
a 3.28 to a 8.01% price dec
Promotional prices lower
the impact is modest, rang
Given that the private la
cally insignificant, our re
greater for national bran
more expensive and more
Therefore this finding is

Table 7. Departmental shares of sales
Department

Share

of

Sales

Grocery
46.07%
Dairy
7.99%

Frozen
food
7.05%
HBA
5.77%
Meat

14.52%

Produce

Source:

18.61%

Cotterill

(19
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Table 8. The estimated overall competitive effect of the presence of
Supercenters, by model
Estimated Overall Effect of Wal-Mart
Method

1

Method

2

Without With Without With

Model promotions promotions promotions promotions
A. National brand -6.83%* -5.77% -7.23%* -6.48%
B. Private label -8.01% -6.71% -3.28%* -2.84%

***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significan

conventional supermarkets as a response to
over, we may expect a lower competitive e

their heterogeneity relative to Wal-Mart priva

is not as strong for those goods as for natio
Applying the same weighting scheme to th
Supercenters and conventional supermarkets
ferences by store category and brand type.
also incorporated into these overall price dif
price differences were included in the calcu
On average, our results indicate that Super
at competing stores by 14 to 17% for nation
private labels. Supercenter prices are overal
to 23% for national brands and 14 to 18% fo
of promotional activity shown in table 9 is g
in table 8. This is consistent with Supercent
in contrast to supermarkets.
The extent to which Supercenter prices ar
kets is consistent with the estimates availa
and Leibtag (2004, 2005), that is, between 8
ences between Supercenters and supermarke
for national brand products. One likely exp

Table 9. The estimated overall price difference between
supercenters and supermarkets
Competing Stores Comparison Stores
Without With Without With

Model promotions promotions promotions promotions
A. National brand -17.13%*** -13.84% -22.90%*** -18.93%
B. Private label -9.90%** -6.80% -17.66*** -14.30%

***: Difference is significant at the 0.01 level **: Significant at the 0
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brands is the process through which the food retailers obtain their wares. National

brand products are purchased from national brand manufacturers and distributors. Dobson and Waterson and Chen have argued that Wal-Mart possesses market
power to countervail that of manufacturers, which drives down the prices of the
products purchased from suppliers. The supermarket chains of New England such
as Stop n' Shop and IGA are too small to possess such power, resulting in a cost
advantage for Wal-Mart Supercenters. Private label products, alternatively, are
produced through a form of vertical integration and countervailing power plays
less of a role in the process by which Wal-Mart obtains its Great Value product

line.

The margin between brands has been a frequently visited topic in the literature
on supermarket pricing (Berges-Sennou, Bontems, and Requillart). With Wal-Mart
Supercenters taking an increasing importance in food retailing, it becomes relevant to question their effect on the national brand/private label margin. We can
shed some light on this question. According to our results, Supercenters have a
greater price impact on national brands than on private labels. Combining this
result with the fact that national brands are more expensive than private labels
suggests that Supercenters reduce the national brand/private label margin of the
supermarkets with which they compete.

Discussion and Conclusions

Wal-Mart is introducing Supercenters at a fast pace in the United St
pecially in regions such as New England and California where Wal-Mar
smaller presence. The projected introduction of a Supercenter typicall
much controversy and debate concerning the economic impacts of the n
In this article, we examine one aspect of the impact of introducing Supe
that is the effect on grocery prices. More specifically, using a unique da
examine the competitive effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at
tional supermarkets in New England. This effect was examined for the
supermarket departments (dairy, frozen goods, health and beauty aids
meat, produce, and dry grocery) as well as both national brand and priv
goods. We also examine the extent to which Wal-Mart's grocery prices a
than those at conventional supermarkets. Thus, this article sheds some
the pricing strategy of Wal-Mart Supercenters and the response of supe
when facing direct competition from a Supercenter.
The primary findings of this study are as follows:

1) Wal-Mart Supercenters result in a decrease in grocery prices betwe
7% for national brand goods at conventional supermarkets competing
a radius of 5 miles from the Supercenter. The associated decrease in t
of private label goods is between 3 and 8%. These findings are in lin
those in the literature, more specifically those of Hausman and Leibt

who found an indirect price effect of Wal-Mart of 5% of consumer expen

Given that national brand goods are more expensive, Supercenters l
price margin between branded and unbranded goods.
2) The greatest impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters, in terms of price dec
in the grocery and dairy departments for both national brands and
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labels. Lower prices are also observed for national brand produce, and private
label HBA. Supercenters have no statistically significant effect on goods in the
frozen food department.
3) Taking into account market concentration, demographic variables, and store
characteristics, Wal-Mart Supercenters price national brand and private label
products significantly lower than conventional supermarkets. The estimated
average price difference between Supercenters and supermarkets for national
brand products ranges from 14 to 23%. The corresponding differences for
private labels are lower, ranging from 7 to 18%.
The greater overall competitive effect of Supercenters on national brand than
on private label prices may reflect a strategic effort by competing supermarkets
to increase consumer traffic or maintain customer loyalty. Dhar and Hoch found
that a common strategy for supermarkets to increase consumer traffic is to lower

the price and improve promotions on national brands as well as carry a greater
number and assortment of national brands. In a region such as New England,
which is wealthy relative to the nation as a whole, consumer demand for national
brand products is high and this strategy may be particularly effective.
The magnitude of the impact of Wal-Mart Supercenters can be conceptualized
in the context of food expenditures. An average American family, with a total
household income between $50,000 and $69,999, spends $1,300 per person annually on food intended for at-home consumption.1 This range encompasses
many of the cities and towns sampled for this study, as well as much of New
England. According to our results, a family can expect to save between $37 and
$104 per person annually by shopping exclusively at conventional supermarkets located within a 5-mile radius from a Supercenter, allowing for the shopping basket to consist of some combination of national brand and private label
products.12
The annual savings for consumers shopping entirely at Supercenters are larger.
The size of the savings depends on whether the alternative supermarket directly
competes with a Supercenter or not. Consumers living within 5 miles of Supercenters can achieve estimated annual savings ranging from $88 to $223 per person
annually, if they shop at Supercenters rather than at competing supermarkets.
Shoppers willing to travel from cities and towns without Supercenters can save
between $186 and $298 per person annually on grocery expenditures by shopping
at Supercenters relative to conventional supermarkets.
Note, however, that these estimated savings attributed to Supercenters may
not accurately reflect consumer behavior due to the effect of promotions on the
composition of the consumer's basket. Blattberg and Neslin found that promotional price cuts have striking effects on sales in the short term. For example, the
authors determined that, a national brand product given a 10% price decrease and
a display advertisement sees an average sales increase of 101% during the promotion. Given that consumers flock to promotional items, the estimated savings
calculated above must be considered upper bounds.
The controversies surrounding Wal-Mart beg the question "Is Wal-Mart good
for the economy?" This question can typically only be partially answered because so many economic factors must be considered. Wal-Mart's effects on customers, employees, competitors, and distributors must all be taken into account.
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In this article, we focused on the retail price impact of Supercenters. Based on

our empirical results, we conclude that Wal-Mart Supercenters have a positive welfare effect on price-sensitive consumers. Consumers who seek to purchase their groceries as inexpensively as possible benefit from the presence of
Supercenters.
The results presented in this article suggest possible avenues for further research. One such exploration is the applicability of these results to the national
level. Our results are in line with previous estimates of price differences between
Supercenters and supermarkets (Bianco and Zellner; Hausman and Leibtag, 2005).
However, in estimating the price reductions at supermarkets resulting from the
presence of Supercenters we have little basis for comparison in the economic literature. New England is wealthier and more densely populated than the United
States on average, and the supermarket chains visited for this study were regional
chains.

Arguments can be made supporting the notion that the effect of Supercenters
on conventional supermarket prices would be less pronounced in New England
than in the rest of the nation on average. The market share and profits reaped
by Supercenters share an inverse relationship with income and concentration
(Franklin). If Supercenters obtain lower market shares or less consumer traffic in
New England relative to the United States as a whole, then supermarkets may
react to Supercenters' presence in two ways. They could place less weight on a
price response and more weight on a product differentiation response, such as
increasing the quantity and/or quality of service provided. Supermarkets could
also react generally less strongly to Supercenters' presence in higher-income regions. Both of these reactions would translate into a lower effect of Supercenters
on grocery prices in New England than in the United States on average. Alternatively, arguments can be made in favor of Supercenters having a higher effect
relative to the United States as a whole. Our results suggest that grocery prices
share positive relationships with household income and concentration. If this result holds on a national level, as found by Lamm and Cotterill (1999b) in the case
of income and by Lamm, Cotterill (1986), and Yu and Connor in the case of concentration, then grocery prices may be higher on average in New England than
in other regions of the United States. Thus, unless higher prices are associated
with higher costs, there may be more possibilities to lower prices, which would
result in greater price effects attributed to the presence of Supercenters. It would

therefore be worthwhile to apply this study to regions such as the southeast,
where household income is lower than the U.S. average and where Supercenters
are established for the longest time, or the west coast where income is high and
Wal-Mart's presence is relatively new.
In addition to the implications resulting from the regression analysis, the coefficient of variation (CV) pattern in the price indexes show that for nearly all departments and for both national brand and private label products, supermarkets
competing with Supercenters have higher price variability than those located further away from the nearest Supercenter. This finding may reflect a reduction in the
ability of supermarkets to coordinate promotional patterns. It may also reflect the

presence of nonprice competitive strategies in addition to standard price-cutting
strategy. In fact, several of the competing supermarkets visited for data collection were recently renovated, featuring amenities such as gas stations, salons, or
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coffee shops. The CV pattern calls for an exploration of the strategies utilized by
supermarkets when faced with competition from Supercenters. In general, more
research is needed on the short-run and long-run price and nonprice response
of supermarkets to the entry of Wal-Mart Supercenters. Such research would enable a better understanding of the profitability and viability of the supermarket
industry in the context of the rapid proliferation of Wal-Mart Supercenters.
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Endnotes

1The variety effect accounts for the lower prices at supercenters relative to traditional superm

as well as the value of having access to a new outlet. It is obtained by comparing the cons
expenditure at existing and new outlets at post introduction prices with consumers' expendit
the reservation price for the new outlet, while keeping utility constant. The reservation pric
price such that the demand for the new outlet is zero.

2For a review of the literature on national brand and private label products, see Berges-Se
Bontems, and Requillart.
3See Appendix A for information on the stores sampled and their location.
4See Appendix B for the complete market basket as well as the average price of each product a

18 stores.

5Expressing prices in relative term eliminates the effect of package-size discrepancy across products.
6For example, the expected price index value for the dairy department at competing stores is given

by (o + ,1 + 6 + 8, while the expected price index for the dairy department at comparison stores

is (o + 11 + P7 + 13.

7Areas falling below the median income value in the data set are not necessarily low-income areas
as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.
8Note that five of the twelve conventional retailers in our sample are relatively large supermarkets
with store areas greater than 50,000 square feet. Those stores have amenities, such as a coffee shop or
deli area, which are typically not found in smaller stores.
9The mean national brand departmental price index is 118.65 while the mean private label index is

90.69.

10Given that there is no private label produce, the department share of sales are adjusted accordingly
for private labels. For example, the share of grocery is 56.88% for private label.
1This value is from the 2004 Bureau of Labor Statistics report Consumer Expenditures in 2004.

12The savings figures are calculated based on the range of price decrease estimates reported in
table 8. The percentage price differences between competing and comparison supermarkets range
from 2.84% to 8.01% across national brands and private labels, when including the results adjusted
for promotional prices.
13Joint tests of significance were performed for the appropriate binary and interaction terms. For

example, for national brand dairy, we tested Ho: COMPETE + COMPETEDAIRY = COMPARE +

COMPAREDAIRY.

14These values were obtained by multiplying the weighted average percentage of products on s
in any given week at Stop n' Shop and Big Y by the average percentage discount. For example, ta
6 reports that the overall discount from promotions of national brand (NB) products at compet
stores is 3.81%. It is computed as follows. The weighted average promotional price reduction of t
NB products found in our market basket at competing stores was 24.64%. Across Stop n' Shop a
Big Y stores, a weighted average of 15.47% of NB products were on promotion in any given wee
Therefore the estimated overall price reduction encountered by consumers is .2464 * .1547 = .0381
3.81%. We have no data on the promotional activity of IGA stores, which constitute two of the twelv
supermarkets sampled for this study. These calculations assume that IGA's promotions follow th
weighted promotion average of Stop n' Shop and Big Y.
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Appendix A: Stores Sampled and their Characteristics

Median Store
Household Size

Store Type Location Population Income ($) (sq. feet)

Wal-Mart Supercenter North Windham, 38,680 30,155 55,000
CT

Super Stop Competing North Windham, 38,680 30,155 41,000
n' Shop CT

Super Stop Comparison Vernon-Rockville, 35,771 44,510 37,000
n' Shop CT

Wal-Mart Supercenter Westerly, RI 22,966 44,613 57,000
Super Stop Competing Westerly, RI 22,966 44,613 47,000
n' Shop

Super Stop Comparison Seekonk, MA 13,425 56,364 51,000
n' Shop

Wal-Mart Supercenter Jewett City, CT 3,053 45,826 63,000

Better Value Competing Jewett City, CT 3,053 45,826 22,000
IGA

Better Value Comparison Plainfield, CT 14,619 42,851 15,000
IGA

Wal-Mart Supercenter Ware, MA 9,707 36,875 55,000
Big Y Competing Ware, MA 9,707 36,875 29,000
Big Y Comparison Stafford Springs, 11,307 52,699 35,000
CT

Wal-Mart Supercenter Waterford, CT 19,152 56,047 66,000
Super Stop Competing Waterford, CT 19,152 56,047 50,000
n' Shop

Super Stop Comparison Fairhaven, MA 16,159 41,696 60,000
n' Shop

Wal-Mart Supercenter Raynham, MA 11,739 64,464 67,000
Super Stop Competing Raynham, MA 11,739 64,464 67,000
n' Shop

Stop n' Comparison Attleboro, MA 42,068 50,807 60,000
Shop
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Appendix B: The Market Basket of Products

Minimum Maximum Average Standard
Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
Coca-Cola 2-liter Grocery 1.07 1.59 1.38 0.17
PL Cola 2-liter Grocery 0.50 0.99 0.66 0.16
Maxwell House Grocery 1.97 3.29 2.49 0.46
Coffee (13 oz.)

PL coffee (13 oz.) Grocery 1.67 2.69 2.03 0.37
Bumble Bee tuna Grocery 1.12 1.59 1.38 0.17
(6 oz.)

PL tuna (6 oz.) Grocery 0.88 1.39 1.17 0.16
Cheerios (15 oz.) Grocery 2.44 3.99 3.15 0.62

PL O-shaped Grocery 1.50 2.88 2.02 0.47
cereal (15 oz.)

Lays potato chips Grocery 1.99 2.99 2.66 0.48
(12 oz.)

PL potato chips Grocery 1.47 1.99 1.77 0.25
(12 oz.)

Kraft Mac n' Grocery 0.66 1.39 0.97 0.19
Cheese

(7.25 oz.)

PL Mac n' Cheese Grocery 0.33 0.60 0.44 0.10
(7.25 oz.)

Prego pasta Grocery 1.50 2.69 2.00 0.38
sauce (26 oz.)

PL pasta sauce Grocery 1.00 1.59 1.29 0.23
(26 oz.)

Jif creamy peanut Grocery 2.68 3.89 3.11 0.34
butter (28 oz.)

PL creamy Grocery 2.12 2.89 2.49 0.25
peanut butter
(28 oz.)

Del Monte sliced Grocery 0.88 1.59 1.25 0.24
peaches
(15.25 oz.)

PL sliced peaches Grocery 0.78 1.29 0.99 0.18
(15.25 oz.)

Nabisco chips Grocery 2.50 4.15 3.21 0.59
ahoy (16 oz.)

PL chocolate chip Grocery 0.78 2.99 1.92 0.88
cookies (16 oz.)

Heinz ketchup Grocery 1.29 1.99 1.65 0.20
(24 oz.)

PL ketchup Grocery 0.78 1.39 1.07 0.19
(24 oz.)

Bisquik pancake Grocery 2.23 3.19 2.72 0.35
mix (40 oz.)

PL pancake mix Grocery 1.15 2.49 1.79 0.45
(40 oz.)
(Continued)
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Table Appendix B. Continued
Minimum Maximum Average Standard

Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
Hood milk 1% Dairy 2.96 4.15 3.51 0.44
milk (gallon)

PL 1% milk Dairy 2.37 3.75 2.94 0.47
(gallon)

Kraft American Dairy 1.97 3.99 2.87 0.85
singles (16 ct.)

PL American Dairy 1.77 3.35 2.47 0.65
singles (16 ct.)

Land o' Lakes Dairy 3.24 4.77 4.03 0.67
butter (1 lb.)

PL butter (1 lb.) Dairy 2.50 3.99 3.08 0.55
Breyers vanilla Frozen 3.24 6.57 4.70 1.08
ice cream

(1/2 gal.)

PL vanilla ice Frozen 2.50 5.49 3.41 1.02
cream

(1/2 gal.)

Eggo homestyle Frozen 1.50 2.37 1.85 0.32
waffles (10 ct.)

PL homestyle Frozen 1.00 1.99 1.28 0.35
waffles (10 ct.)

Birdseye frozen Frozen 0.73 1.89 1.14 0.34
broccoli

(10 oz.)

PL

frozen

Frozen

0.59

1.19

0.89

0.20

broccoli

(10 oz.)

Q-Tips cotton HBA 2.95 3.99 3.57 0.47
swabs (500 ct.)

PL cotton swabs HBA 1.88 3.49 2.73 0.66

(500 ct.)
Dial antibacterial HBA 1.62 2.65 2.06 0.32

soap (3 ct.)

PL antibacterial HBA 1.47 1.99 1.58 0.19

soap (3 ct.)

Edge shaving gel HBA 1.78 3.89 2.65 0.50
(7 oz.)

PL shaving gel HBA 1.14 3.59 1.92 0.74
(7 oz.)

Purdue chicken Meat 0.59 2.29 1.62 0.58
drumsticks

(1 lb.)

PL

chicken

Meat

0.59

2.29

1.29

0.43

3.40

0.78

drumsticks

(1 lb.)
Perri

Italian

sausage

(1

Meat

2.38

3.99

lb.)
(Continued)
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Table Appendix B. Continued
Minimum Maximum Average Standard
Product Department Price ($) Price ($) Price ($) Deviation ($)
PL

Italian

sausage

Meat

(1

2.22

4.59

2.96

0.64

lb.)

Oscar Meyer Meat 4.87 5.49 4.98 0.14

bacon (1 lb.)
PL bacon (1 lb.) Meat 1.98 4.99 3.29 0.61

Perfect orchard Produce 2.44 3.99 3.38 0.64
red delicious

apples (1 lb.)

Russet

red

Produce

0.66

1.69

1.24

0.30

potatoes (1 lb.)

Bolthouse farms Produce 0.58 1.99 0.83 0.47

carrots (1 lb.)

Foxy lettuce head Produce 0.78 1.99 1.30 0.41
(head)
Chiquita bananas Produce 0.38 0.69 0.55 0.11
(1 lb.)

Foxy celery (1 lb.) Produce 1.24 2.21 1.57 0.33
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